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Problems of Profit Determination Encountered
By Government Contractors
Vera B. Coulter, CPA
Just as weapon systems have grown more
and more complex so have the provisions sur
rounding government contracts. If the products
being purchased by the government were those
being used in every-day commercial activity so
that prices and performance were well estab
lished, all contracts could be firm-fixed price,
and accounting problems would be little dif
ferent from those for commercial products.
However, much of the work done for the gov
ernment has not been done before, making it
impossible to estimate the costs of doing the
work and to arrive at what both parties con
sider a fair price on a firm-fixed-price basis at
the time the contract is originally negotiated.
Hence, contracts range all the way from firmfixed-price to cost-plus-fixed-fee with various
degrees of incentive provisions in between.
Whenever cost-type contracts are involved,
the issue of what constitutes reimbursable
costs becomes important because the contrac
tor’s sales price depends on the costs for which
he will receive payment. These costs are deter
mined by the terms of the contracts and other
regulations incorporated therein. The basic
principles and procedures regarding contracts
with the Department of Defense are described
in the Armed Service Procurement Regulations
usually referred to as ASPR. Other government
agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration and the Atomic Energy
Commission, have their own regulations as they
do not come under the Department of Defense.
Section XV of ASPR which is entitled “Con
tract Cost Principles and Procedures” is im
portant to accountants dealing with govern
ment contracts. This section states that the
contractor will be reimbursed for direct and
indirect costs. Direct costs are not limited to
material and labor but are costs identified
specifically with a contract. Thus it is permis
sible to charge items which would normally be
charged to overhead directly to contract costs,
provided that like items are not charged to
overhead and distributed to the same contract.
Indirect costs are reimbursable to the ex
tent that they are determined to be reasonable,
allocable and allowable in view of other factors
set forth in ASPR. ASPR 15-201.3 states that
“A cost is reasonable if, in its nature or amount,
it does not exceed that which would be in
curred by an ordinarily prudent person in the
conduct of competitive business.” ASPR 15-

201.4 provides that “A cost is allocable if it
is assignable or chargeable to a particular cost
objective, such as a contract, product, product
line, process or class of customer or activity,
in accordance with the relative benefits re
ceived or other equitable relationship. Subject
to the foregoing, a cost is allocable to a govern
ment contract if it:
(i)
is incurred specifically for the contract;
(ii) benefits both the contract and other
work, . . . and can be distributed to
them in reasonable proportion to the
benefits received; or
(iii) is necessary to the overall operation of
the business, although a direct rela
tionship to any particular cost objective
cannot be shown.”
Among the other factors are costs specifically
excluded, such as trade or institutional advertis
ing, bad debts, contributions and interest or
other financing costs. This entire section of
ASPR is stated in rather general terms and
there is often a difference of opinion on the
interpretation made by the government audi
tors and the contractor’s accountants.
Cost-type contracts may provide for reim
bursement of actual overhead costs or negoti
ated overhead rates. Under the negotiated
overhead rate provisions, the contractor is re
quired to submit an overhead claim usually
within 90 days after the close of his fiscal
year. This claim is then subject to audit by the
government auditors who submit an audit re
port stating their findings. This information be
comes the basis for the government represent
ative to meet with the contractor and negotiate
a rate. It is this negotiated overhead rate that
becomes part of the sales price of the contract.
Since negotiations may be held anywhere from
six months to a year after the close of the
contractor’s fiscal year and since it may be even
longer before a rate is agreed upon, it is easy
to see that determining the amount of over
head for which the contractor will be reim
bursed can become a problem.
After the contractor has decided on the over
head rates to use in computing his sales price,
he still has to be concerned over how much fee
to accrue since sales recorded under cost-type
contracts are based on costs as incurred plus
all allocable fees. In the case of cost-plus-fixedfee (CPFF) contracts, he knows how much his
total fee is and the problem of allocating the fee
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becomes similar to any contract where per
centage-of-completion method is used to de
termine gross profit. For the past several years
many of the large contracts have been CPFF
type of contracts. Prior to 1965, 80% of
NASA’s business was awarded on a CPFF
basis because of the difficulty of setting a
firm-fixed price for such products as a capsule
to go to the moon. Now more and more NASA
contracts contain cost-incentive features. Cost
incentives may be incorporated into fixed-price
incentive contracts or cost-plus-incentive-fee
contracts.
Cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contracts
provide for the negotiation of a target cost,
a target fee, a maximum fee and a minimum
fee, and a fee adjustment formula. For instance,
consider a contract with a target cost of $100,
000, a target fee of $7,000, and a fee adjust
ment formula of 80%-government and 20%contractor. Assume that a maximum fee of
$9,000 was provided and a minimum fee of
$5,000. If the total cost is decreased from the
target cost of $100,000 to $95,000 the con
tractor’s fee increases 20% of $5,000 or from
$7,000 to $8,000. This fee continues to in
crease until cost reduction reaches $10,000,
making costs $90,000 at which time the maxi
mum fee will be earned and any further cost
reduction will benefit only the government.
Conversely, if the cost goes up to $105,000,
the contractor’s fee will go from $7,000 to
$6,000. By the time the cost reaches $110,000,
the contractor will be entitled only to the
minimum fee of $5,000 and any other cost will
be born solely by the government. It is in
teresting to note that once the minimum fee is
reached a CPIF contract becomes in effect a
CPFF contract, with the contractor receiving
a fixed fee plus his reimbursable costs.
Under the fixed-price incentive contract,
there is negotiated a target cost, a target profit,
a price ceiling, but not a profit ceiling or floor,
and a formula for establishing the final profit
and price. This formula is based on the rela
tionship which final negotiated total cost bears
to total target cost. Once the price ceiling is
reached in this type of contract, it becomes
like a firm-fixed-price contract with any addi
tional costs borne by the contractor.
Sharing formulas come in a wide variety and
depend upon the contractor’s and the govern
ment’s confidence in the target cost, the proba
bility of overruns or underruns and the dif
ference between target fees and maximum and
minimum fees.
In addition to providing cost incentives,
the government is now attempting through the
use of weighted guidelines to establish the
profit according to the degree of risk under
taken by the contractor. These guidelines sug
gest ranges for various cost elements within a

given contract ranging from 1% to 4% for
purchased parts and materials, to 9% to 15%
for engineering labor. The contract negotiator
assigns the rate he thinks most applicable and
multiplies this rate by the target cost to arrive
at the target profit by cost element. These tar
get profits by cost element are then added
together to arrive at a total target profit which
is divided by total target cost to arrive at the
rate. The rate is then adjusted either up or
down depending upon the contractor’s assump
tion of risk, his record of past performance and
other selected factors. Once the percentage
profit is reached, weighted guidelines add no
additional complications to the accountant’s
task of accruing profit.
This is not to say that there are no addi
tional complications, for the government in its
attempt to increase the profit motive of gov
ernment contractors has now gone to more and
more types of incentives. Among these is one
created by value engineering.
Value engineering is an organized effort on
the part of the contractor directed at achieving
the same products, quality and performance at
a lower cost. The value engineering clause al
lows the contractor to retain a predetermined
share of all cost savings resulting from the
effort. After the cost reduction is determined
and approved by the contracting officer, the
target cost and fees are adjusted accordingly.
Under incentive contracts, the contractor’s
share of the savings may be as high as 50%.
This means that the accountant must take these
changes into consideration before starting to
determine the profit to accrue.
An increasing number of contracts now have
performance incentives. Performance incentives
consist of such items as the following:
Performance of the Product
Range of a missile
Speed of aircraft
Thrust of an engine
Maneuverability
Fuel economy

Performance of the Contractor
Delivery
Meeting test schedules
Quality control
Maintenance requirement
Reliability

These incentives are handled in much the
same way as cost incentives in that a fee is
decided upon for the various incentives. With
in the range of acceptable achievement, addi
tional fees are then awarded for bettering the
goals or penalties assessed for failure to reach
them.

(continued to page 10)
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It would be well at this time to review returns
filed for those periods to determine that all
elections have been validly made. Any deficien
cies can then be remedied within the statu
tory period.

Problems of Profit Determination
Encountered by Government Contractors

While on the subject of elections there are
certain statutory limitations upon related cor
porations where controlling dates are most im
portant. As previously stated, December 31 is
the controlling date when apportioning the
$25,000 surtax exemption under Section 1561
and the multiple surtax election under Section
1562 of the Code. In the case of the $25,000
limitation of investment credit the apportion
ment is as of the last day of the parent com
pany’s tax year. On the other hand, apportion
ment of the additional first year depreciation
under Section 179 of the Code is based on the
years of the members of the group ending with,
or within, the parent’s tax year.

For instance, assume a contract for pro
duction of an airplane with the following pro
visions :

While the controlled corporation sections of
the Code are of paramount importance, there
are many other tax aspects which should be con
sidered. The 1964 Revenue Act has given rise
to new problems that are apt to be overlooked
upon first exposure to the Act. One of these
is unintentional dividends. Prior to enactment
of Sections 1245 and 1250 of the Code it was
common practice for related corporations to
transfer fixed assets to one another at their
net book value. If the fair market value of these
assets is in excess of that value, the Treasury
Department may adjust in accordance with the
recapture provisions; and, at the same time,
characterize the bargain transfer as a dividend
over to the recipient corporation.

When purchasing used Section 38 property,
credit may be taken up to $50,000 of the
purchase price in any one year. In the case of
an affiliated group (which contemplates more
than 50% stock ownership) the $50,000 must
be apportioned among the members of the
group on the ratio of used property purchased
by each, to total used property purchased by
the group. The danger here is that if a Sub
chapter S corporation is a member of the group
it is frequently overlooked in the apportion
ment calculation, because of its nontaxable
status. This credit flows through to the indivi
dual stockholders, but is based on apportion
ment at corporate level.

(continued from page 4)

Maximum
Reward

Maximum
Penalty

Target

Performance 1,050 MPH 1,000 MPH 990 MPH
Cost
$80 Million $100 Million$140 Million
Schedule
27 Months 30 Months 33 Months
Incentives
Performance $6 Million $2 Million
0
Cost
7 Million 5 Million
$0 Million
Schedule
1 Million 0 Million - 1 Million

$14 Million $7 Million

-$1 Million

In this case if target is achieved on every
thing, the fee will be $7 Million. The fee could
be increased to $14 Million if the maximums
were reached on all incentives or fall as low as
a negative $1 Million.
It now becomes apparent that the contractor
may have some trade-off choices. He may have
produced the airplane at a cost of $80 Million
within 27 months and have achieved a per
formance of 990 MPH, thus making him en
titled to a fee of $8 Million. He may decide
that by spending an additional $20 Million in
another six months, he can increase the per
formance to 1,050 MPH and thereby achieve
the maximum product performance fee. In this
case his fee would be as follows:

Performanc
e
Cost
Schedule

In 27 Months

In 33 Months

0
$7 Million
1 Million

$ 6 Million
5 Million
-1 Million

$8 Million

$10 Million

He would have increased his fee by $2 Million.
The trade-off choices shown above are possible
under the contract. However, government con
tractors must keep foremost in mind that the
best possible product, at the lowest cost, must
be delivered on time.
It is easy to see that the incentives are inter
woven and must be considered together in
order to compute the final profit which will be
realized on the contract. The accountant’s task
thus becomes complex, for not only must he
obtain engineering and production estimates of
cost to complete the contract; but he must
also obtain estimates of time and performance.
Having obtained the estimates, he must review
them before making a decision of how much
fee to accrue.

Only a very few of the problems of related
corporations have been touched upon here,
but the basis of their selection is the frequency
with which they occur, regardless of the size
of operation. It is hoped that attention has
been called to the necessity of the accountant
giving thought to the many problems inherent
in the existence of an affiliated group.
D.L.B.

(concluded on page 14)
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(continued from page 10)
He is also faced with some problems in ac
counting theory. Should he accrue a fee on
performance because the engineers say that the
product will reach a certain performance when
only a final test will prove that such a perform
ance has been achieved? Should he wait for
the test, thereby increasing or decreasing profit
possibly as much as a million dollars at one
time? These are major decisions which ac
countants can and do argue pro and con.
Having thus arrived at the fee rate to accrue
and the costs believed to be reimbursable, the
accountant can proceed to prepare his financial
statements. At this point, he still has to worry
about whether the Renegotiation Board will
take part of it away from him.

In accordance with Article V, Sections 1
through 4, of the Bylaws of the American
Woman’s Society of Certified Public Ac
countants, notice is hereby given that the
regular Annual Meeting of the Society will
be held at 9:00 A.M. on Saturday, October
1, 1966 in the Somerset Hotel, Boston,
Massachusetts.
Frances D. Britt
Secretary 1965-1966
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